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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SCOTT BRIGHAM, by Frank E.
Brigham, Guardian ad ]item,
Appellant,
vs.
LA KE ELECTRIC ASSOCIIXC'., a Utah corporation,
Appellee,

t

)

Case No.
11869

BRIEF OF APPELLANT SCOTT BRIGHAM,
by FRANK E. BRIGHAM, GUARDIAN AD LITEM

NATURE OF THE CASE
On June 28, 1968, Frank E. Brigham and three of
his sons, :Jiichael, Steven and Scott, along with Stephen
Croft, a neighbor boy, left Salt Lake on a camping trip.
The purpose of their expedition was to search for arrowl10ads. rrhey spent the night at a campsite east of
Hoosenlt near Fort Duchesne in Uintah County. The
1wxt morning they arose, ate breakfast and began their
They spread out, leaving some distance between
l'nch person, so as to co\·er a larger area of ground,
1

and climbed a small mesa m the neighborhood of the
campsite. (Tr. 12-18).
A power pole, located on top of the mesn, carrying
Moon Lake's transmission lines had rotted, broken and
fallen to the ground. The power lines lay on or near
ground level. As he approached the downed lines,
::\Iiehael, a boy of about 15, noticed two wires, both
rather taut and not very far off the ground. As he
stopped to go under the wires, he bumped into one of
the lines with his forehead (Tr. 242). Scott, then about
age 10, asked his brother if the wires were live (Tr. 242).
According to defendant's e\'idence, Michael answered to
the effect that the wires did not contain any electricity
(Tr. 242). As he ducked to go under the wires, Scott
came in contact with a liYe wire from which he received
an electrical shock, causing hums and rendering him lifeless. (Tr. 136). He was saYed only thr'.Jugh the expeditious application of artificial respiration by his father
(Tr. 19-21). Immediately thereafter, Scott was rushed
to the hospital in Roosevelt, where he was treated and
released (Tr. 23). As a result of his contact with the
electric power line, Scott received severe, though localized, burns requiring extensive treatment, including
rather delicate skin grafting operations (Tr. 138-145,
160).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was submitted to the jury on interrogatories which were answered as follows:
"We, the jury, find the following answers
to questions put to us:
2

1. '.Vere the employees and agents of the defr11clanL Moon Lake Electric Association negligent in maintaining the electric transmission
Yes
(yes or no)

2. If your answer to question No. 1 is 'yes',
then answer the following question:
\Vas such negligence a proximate cause of
the injury to the plaintiff Scott
Yes
(yes or no)
3. \Vas the plaintiff Scott Brigham negli-

gent in coming in to contact with the electric
transmission line?
Yes
(yes or no)

4. If your answer to question No. 3 is 'yes',
then answer the following question:
\Vas such negligence a proximate cause of
the injury to the plaintiff Scott
:_'"es
(yes or no)
5. vVhat sum of money would compensate
plaintiffs for special
$736.80
6. What sum of money would reasonably
compensate plaintiff Scott Brigham for general
damages? $2,500.00" (Tr. 161).
A judgment of no cause of action was entered
against plaintiff based upon the finding of contributory
negligence. This appeal is prosecuted from that judgment.
3

RELIEF SOUGHT O"N" APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment entered
by the trial court and remand for a new trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO
THE EXTENT OF DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY.
(a) The co1Tect rule is strict liability in situations like
that presented in the present case.

The court at trial instructed the jury that the defendant should only he liable if clefendr-nt ·was negligent
;n allowing the power pole to rot an<l fall. Plaintiff submitted a re(1uected instruction (R. 123), which was denied, asserting that utility companies should be strictly
liable when, because of defects exclusi\·cly under their
control, injuries occur and losses result. A1)pellant submits that the rule of law contained in the rejected instruction is the rule imposed hy the statutes of Utah,
that it is the better rule, that this Court should so rule,
and that the case should be remand0cl with instructions
that the defendant in this rase is strictly liable for all
injuries resulting from the (lrfrcti\·e pole nrnl transmission line.
Srdion 3-1-7-22 of the lTtah Code ..:\nnotated (Rep.
vol. 195;3) states:
'' (1) In case any pnhlic utility shall clo or
cause or permit to he clone any ad, mntter or
thing prohibited, forbicldrn or declared to he u11-
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lawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter or
thing rey_uired to be done, either by the Constitution or any law of this State or by any order or
decision of the commission, such public utility
shall be liable to the persons affected thereby for
all loss, damages or injury caused thereby or resulting therefrom, and if the court shall find that
the act or ommission was wilful, the court shall,
in addition to the actual damages, award exemplary damages. An action to recover for such
loss, damage or injury may be brought in any
court of competent jurisdiction by any person.
(2) No recoYery as in this section provided
shall in any manner affect a recovery by the
state of the penalties in this title provided."
(Emphasis added.)
The Utah Public Service Commission, the regulatory
l)otl:· oYerset•ing the operation of power companies, has
adopted h:· Order No. 54 with Supplemental Order No.
2 on the 26th of 1f arch, 1963, Safety Rules for the
fostallation and :\f aintenance of Electric Supply and
Communieatiou Lines, Handbook 81, (1961) as published
h:· the U. 8. Department of Commerce, National Bureau
of Sta11clards. Section 213 (A) (2) (Page 44) of Handhook 81 states:
''Lines and equipme11t shall be systematically infrom time to time by the person responsible for th0 installation." (Emphasis added.)
S JJecf ed

The record clearly shows that defendants had no
s,11ste111otic progrmn for inspecting their power lines (Tr.
(i4, 8±). Oecasicmally an airplane would fly over the
power lin0s to see if any power poles were down (Tr.
8.i-87). The flights were usually made only after wind;)

storms, heaYy snow storms, dcC'r season or similar occurrences when the power company might expect to have
problems with th0ir power lines. Exrept for a Yisual
inspection after a pole had been r0moved, the c:ompa11y
made no inspection of the pol0s themselves to see if they
were sound and fit. Pole removal, of course, 'Was carried
out on a Yery irregular and intermittent basis. For poles
that were left in the ground, there was no actual program
of regular inspection (Tr. 83-88).
Such sporadic and ineffective inspection as was conducted hy defendant does not meet the requirement that
lines shall be "systematically inspected from time to
time." Bera use Section 54-7-22 imposes liability, irrespecfr1;e of negligence or fault, for any Yiolations of the
rules prescribed by the Commission, strict liability is
the rule to be imposed upon a defendant for failure to
follow the rules prescribed by the Commission.
The strength of the public policy embodied in Utah
Code Annota tecl 54-7-22 is reinforced and re-emphasized by § 54-7-25 U.C.A. (Rep. ,·ol. 1933) This section
provides in part :
"(1) Any public utility which Yiolates or

fails to comply with any provisioll of the Constitution of this State or cf this title, or whiC'h fails,
omits or neglects to obey, obsen·e or comply with
any order, decision, decree, rnle, direction, demand or requirement, or any part or provision
thereof, of the commissio11, in a case in which
a penalty has not herein before been pro,·idc<l for
such public utility, is suliject to a penalty of not
less than five hurnlre<l nor more than two thousand dollars for each a11d cv0n· offcns0.
6

"(S) Every violation of the r>rov1s1011s of
this title or of any order, decision decree rule
.
'
'
'
directicn, demand or requirement, or any part or
provision thereof, of the commission, by any corpora ti on or person is a separate and distinct offense, and, in case of a continuing violation, each
day's continuance thereof shall be a separate and
distinct offense.''

This statute imposes criminal penalties to the same extent c\ 54-7-22 imposes civil liabilities. The legislature
has clearly indicated in two separate statutes that power
companies shall follow the orders of the Public Service
Commission; otherwise, they shall pay for their derelictions. r:rhe imposition of strict liability would not be
radical and unjustified judicial legislation; on the contrary, such strict liability is the policy and the law of
the State of Utah.
( b) Even if strict liability were not the rule imposed

by statutej strict liability should be the rule imposed in a
ca.;,e like the present one.

Traditionally the courts have applied a very string0nt and exacting negligence standard to describe the
duty owed by power companies to those who might come
in contact with high power lines. The courts have recognized that such a standard is only commensurate with the
Yery grave risks of injury and death inherent in any
iHstalla ti on transporting large amounts of electricity.
rrhe case of Cornucopia Gold 1lfines v. Locken, 150 F.2d
73 (0th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 763 (1945) presented
a fact situation very similar to the instant case. In
Locken, plaintiff's decedent, a young woman, had wandered off a dirt road, had become entagled with sagging
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fransmission lines, which were dangerously near the
ground, and was electrocuted. The evidence showed that
the defendant had made very irregular inspections of
the power lines. As to the defendant's duty to those who
might become entangled within these power lines, the
court stated:
"\Ve con cl nde that where as in this case the
owner of such a. transmission line wire negligently fails to inspect and repair it and allows
it to become in disrepair and sag near and rest
upon brush on the ground in wild unfenced
mountainous mining country, so that one leaving
a nearby road and walking near or over such
transmission line would likely come in contact
it and therehy be injnred, is guilty of wreckless conduct and wanton negligence rendering the
owner liable for resulting personal lllJury,
ichetlier or not the one injured 1cas a technical or
other kind of trespasser." (130 F.2d 77) (Emphasis added).
In Locken the court avoided def enclant 's defenses by
calling defendant's conduct ''wanton negligence.'' The
court appeared to say that since defendant's conduct
was so had, he should not he able to shield himself with
flimsy defenses. This is precisely the situation in the
present case.
Though apparently never presented "-ith facts
squarely in point 'Sith the present case, the Utnh SnIH'eme Court has stated that power companies do ha,-c n
very high tluty of care indeed. In the case of Toma t.
Utah Power & Light Company, 12 Utah 2cl 278, 363 P.2cl
788,
( 1961), the Court stated:
8

''The cldendant in this case was engaged as a
public utility furnishing electric power to a large
number of customers. It was furnished various
persons under different and peculiar circumstances. In all cases it is required to exercise the
degree of care that a person of ordinary prudence
would under the circumstances. It is well known
that one dealing with electricity deals with a
force of dangerous character and that there is a
constant risk of injury to persons or property if
not properly controlled. The care observed must
1w commensurate with and proportionate to the
clanger. Therefore, the defendant company was
obliged to meet a high standard of care, which
was g-reater in some cases than another depending
on the exigency of the service rendered.''
The courts have imposed upon those dealing in electricity
a much higher standard of care than would be applied to
those dealing in less dangerous articles. The law has
rightly recognized that sound policy demands that power
companies faithfully follow exacting and rigid safety
requirements.
The general theory of tort liability seeks some way
to divide losses. The negligence standard, conveying as
it does some implication of fault, is a somewhat arbitrary
but practical method of distributing losses where the
law could not decide, without the presence of such a
standard, ·where the losses should fall. In the vast majority of cases involving accidents and the need to distribute
losses, the negligence standard makes sense. Unless one
has some stronger reason for allocating the cost of accidents to one party or the other, fault seems to be a way
to make such an allocation without being unduly ar9

bitrary. Through the use of the doctrine of contributory
negligence, the law has taken the position, though by no
rn0ans without doubts, that if both parties are at fault,
then there is no real reason to impose liability on one
party and thus distribute the loss.
HoweYer, when there are reasons for allocating the
damages for injuries to one party or the other, irrespectiYe of fault, then the rationale for the negligence standard no longer has much persuasi\'eness. \Vhen it is
0asy to decide where liability should lie, there is 110 need
to resort to rules, which may be imperfect and questionabl0, to distribute those losses. Indisputably the cost of
maintaining safe electrical transmission systems, portending nri threat to human life, belongs upon po\Yer
companies. Power companies should recognize and be
responsible for the maintenance of the highest safety
standards, and the law should not allow any deYiations
from the highest standards. Not to place these costs of
safe transmission lines on the power companies is to
allow them to avoid their normal costs of doing business.
See Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Lan· of Turts, 72
Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1959).
The rule of negligence liability, when applied to
cases such as the present one, gives to the power company a macabre decision. The power company can estimate what its costs due to liability lawsuits will he if
it does not maintain proper safety standards. It can then
balance those costs against the costs inYolved in maintaining rigidly controlled and inspected transmission
lines. It may decide, however wrongly, that it is cheaper
10

to run the risk of liability lawsuit than to provide the
kind of safety standards which will reasonably and
adequately protect human life and prevent injury. The
law should not allow power companies to make this
choice. Sound public policy would dictate that the power
recognize their responsibility to maintain the
highest safety standards; the law should not leave them
the option of gambling that they can reduce their legitimate costs because of the reluctance of jurors to grant
<:nrnrds or the unwillingness of parties to risk lawsuits.
The theory being advanced here, that damages for
injurie:s resulting from defective installations are a cost
of doing business, is neither novel nor revolutionary. The
law has in several areas recognized the need for the imposition of strict liability. There are two areas of strict
tort liability which have particular relevance for the
cnse at bar: the ultrahazardous activities doctrine, which
should apply to transmission of electricity, and the
products liability area, which offers sound and persuasive policy reasons for imposing liability on the defendant in the case at bar.
The doctrine that one who engages in ultrahazardons activities does so at his peril has been recognized
in Utah. In the case of 111 ad sen v. East Jordan Irrigation
Company, 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d 794, 795 (1942), the
Court stated:
"It is conceded that the rule of absolute liability
prevails when one uses explosives and the blasting of said explosives results in hurling of rock,
earth or debris which causes injury to another."
11

Robison r. Robi.'-011, 16 Utah 2d 2-12, :394 P.2d 876, 877
(1964), another ease dealing with explosives, recognized
the rule:
" [ 0] ne who uses or is responsible for a danger-

ous instrumentality is absolutely liable for any
resulting damage.''
In the case of Southwick v S. S. Mullen, Inc., 19 Utah 2d
430, 432 P.2cl 56 (1967), the Court restated its commitment to the rule of absolute or strict liability in blasting
cases. The theory behind strict liability in the dangerous
instrumentalit:v area is quite simple. The risks of injury
and the potential threat to human life are so great that
the• party who is performing the dangerous act should
pay for all resultant damages and injuries. HaYing to
pay for all resulting costs also compels those engaging
in ultrahazarclous activities to maintain the very strictest and highest safety standards. The law here is recognizing a "felt necesity" and insuring that the powers
of the law will be used to enforce desirable social policy.
Electricity is obviously a yery dangerous instrumentality. This is espeeially true ·when it is being carried
through high voltage transmission lines. As was pointed
out at trial by l\f r. E. Ballard of the
Lake Electric
Associati011, it is Yery difficult, if not impossible to proteet human lifo when people come> into contact with high
Yoltage lin0s. Mr. Ballanl \\·as asked what protection to
human life was actually built into the distribution system.
His answer is significant:
"Protection to human life that is built into the
system is the aetual starnlanl of construetion
ml'aJlS the meehaniC'al
of the poles
J2

and the elevation of the conductor above the
ground and the separation, in other words, from
ground and the ability of a person to come into
contact with a conductor which becomes a physical
thing in the construction." (Tr. 88).
Though not stated with imposing elegance, Mr. Ballard's
point is well taken. The only way life can be protected
"'hen high power lines are involved is to keep the high
power lines away from human beings. If the high power
lines do come close to human activities, then the risks
of injury and possible death become intolerably great;
the duty rests upon the power company to insure that
the power lines never come that close to the ground.
A second area where the principle of strict liability
has been increasingly recognized is the products liability
area. In his famous concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944), Mr.
Justice Traynor outlined the theoretical bases for strict
liability upon the manufacturer of defective consumer
goods:
''
if there is no negligence, however, public
policy demands that responsibility be fixed whereever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to
life and health inherent in defective products that
reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can rtnticipate some hazards and guard
against the recurrence of others, as the public
cannot. Those ·who suffer injury from defective
products are unprepared to meet its
The cost of an injury and the loss of time or
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk
of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
clistrihukd among the public as a cost of domg

business. It is to the public interest to discourage
the marketing of products having defects that are
a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market, it is to the
public interest to place the responsibility for
whatever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, eYen if he is not negligent in the
manufacture of the product, is responsible for its
reaching the market. However intermittently such
injuries may occur and howeYer haphazardly they
may strike, the risk of their occurence is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk
there should be a general and constant protection
and the mannfacturrr is hest situated to afford
such protection.''
In tbr casr of Greenman 1.:. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 377 P.2cl 897, 901(Cal.1962), the policies enunciated
by Justice Traynor in the Escola case, supra, became
accepted as ]a''·'· There the court said:
"rrhe purpose of such linl!ilit;' 18 to insure that
the costs of injuries resulti11g from Jefective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the
injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves.''
Recently the principle of strict liability for defective
products has moved relentlessly forward to virtually
unanimous approval by all courts who haYe been faced
'Yith the issue. Onr leadi11g case ·which applied the doctrine is II e1111ingsr:n c. Bloomfield 111 otors, Inc., 22 N. J.
338, 161 A.2cl G9G ( 1960), i11Yolving a defective steering
wheel in an ant0rnobile. ReeO'i'ery was allowed for a (1efrctive altimeter in an airplane in the case of Goldberg r.
K(l!sman !11str111ne11t CorJJ., 12 N.'.-.2<1 4:3:2, l!H N.K2c1 81
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(1963). Srtict liability 'vas held to apply to live virus in
polio vaecine in Gottcsdanker v. Cutler Laboratories, 6
Cal. Rep. 320 (Cal. App. 1960). Recovery was allowed for
a defcctiYe forkstem in Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338
F.2d 911 (5th Cir.1964).
The products liability area indicates that it is proper
to place the cost of imperfections in the product on those
under whose control and inspection the defects are most
easily found and remedied. Certainly the bottler of the
defective soft cl rink should remedy the failures of his
product. His options are: (1) he may throw out the
clefrch\'e material and replace it with satisfactory material, or ( 2) if he chooses to let the defective material
pass in the market place, then he is responsible for any
cknrnge proximate1y resulting therefrom. Similarly, if
a power company allows a defective pole to rot and fall
to ihe ground, the cost of replacing that pole is clearly
upon the utility company. It has the choice; it can either
bear the cost of putting in the new poles and inspecting
to insure that its poles are in good condition, or it can
allow the pole to fall and pay for all damages proximately resulting therefrom. The products liability area also
helps to giYe a satisfactory workable rule to be applied
in this case: when, because of defects exclusively under
the control or supervision of the defendant povver company, the public comes in contact with the facilities of
the company and serious or graYe injury results therefrom, strict liability is the standard to he applied.
In addition, as with the manufacturer in the proclucts liability area, it is the power company who is in
15

the best position to protect against the loss. The utility
can, by procuring proper insurance, spread the loss
throughout the general consuming public. For a minimal
increase in the monthly electric bill, the losses which
severely fall upon those \Vho are injured can be compensated very cheaply and almost without notice by the
general consuming public. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L. J.
499 (1961).
In other areas the law has recognized that there are
certain situations where the duty to pay for damages
belongs to one party and thus that party should be
strictly liable. The law of trespass and the law of nuisance provide aneient and trenchant examples of strict
liability. In both of these areas it has long heen held that
one 1vho invades the property of another is liable for any
damage8 resulting therefrom, without nuy showing of
negligence on the pnrt of t1Je defendant. Kinsman v. Utah
Gas & Coke Company, 53 -Utah 10, 177 Pac. 418 (HHS).
See Prosser, Torts, 2d Ed., 336, 337; 54 A.L.R. 2d 766.
Thus, in summary, the normal negligence analysis
is entirely inappropriate to the case before us. The cost
of maintaining and inspecting the poles which carry high
transmission liues is clearly a cost to be borne by the
power company. If, through the defects in pole or translines, injury rC'sults, there is 110 need to allocate
losses. It is clear where the risk of loss belongs; it belongs to the pO\\'er company. The lower court should have
plai11tiff 's requeste>d im;truction 011 strict liahility.
Failure to do so was fatal error. The jmlg-m0nt should
16

be reversed and the case should be remanded for trial
on the proper legal theory.

POINT II. CONTRIBUTORY N E G L I GENCE IS NO DEFENSE TO AN ELECTRIC COMP ANY AGAINST WHOM STRICT
LIABILITY IS BEING IMPOSED.
Sound policy dictates that when strict liability is
being imposed, the defendant's potential defenses should
he severely restricted. Power companies have traditionally been subject to very high standards of care, stanclan1s of care which are often in practice indistinguishable from strict liability. The substantive difference behYeen strict liability and the traditional negligence stanllarcls lies in the fact that the power company should
110 longer utilize the often flimsy defense of contributory
negligence. It would make no difference to the power
company whether its standard of care was negligence or
strict liability, so long as the power company felt it still
hac1 the comfortable refuge of local juries largely drawn
from among its customers and fayorable to its case. To
make the policy of strict liability effective and meaningful, the power company should not be able to assert the
clef ense of eontributory negligence.

In aceordance ·with these policy eonsiderations, the
general ru1e is that the eontributory negligence of the
plaiHtiff is not a defense in cases of strict liability; this
is true at least in those cases where the contributory
negligence docs not consist of voluntary exposure to a
known danger. See Prosser, Torts, 2d Ed., page
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341. The Ctah Supn:_·me Court ha,; held that this is the
rule applicable in rtah. In Robison L Robison, supra,
394 P.2d 878, 1i. 8, the rtah Supreme Court said:
"[T]he kind of contributory negligence that
would consist of rol wlf a ry r xpos 11 re {o a k 1101cn
danger, and so amounts to an assumption of risk,
is ordinarily a defense [to strict liability] ... "
( Emhasis added.)
In the case of Ecans r. Stewart, 17 Utah 2d 308, 410
P.2d 999, 1002 (1966), :\Ir. Justice Crockett had this to
say about the difference between contributory negligence
and assumption of risk:
'' Tliis further should be said in regard to the
defense ot' assumption of risk. lt is not identical
with but is closely related to contributory negligence. To im·oke it and preclude recoi-cry there
must /;e a l·ol1111tary as.'!1u1PJtio11 of the risk of a
k1101rn da11grr where 011r lias a reasonable opportunity to make an alternaticc clirjice." (Emphasis
added.)
In tllC' case of Jollllscm c. Jlaynard, 9 Utah 2d 268,
342 P .2cl 884:, 886 ( J 959), tl1e distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence was delineated
thusly:

''Tu gIYmg- tlw fon·going i11structions tlie trial
court f<'ll i11to the error of confusing the doctrine
of assumption of risk with contributory negligence. \Yhile in some instances the phrase 'assumption of risk' is used in defining the rights of
parties where both the plaintiff and defendant are
charged with negligence, in such situations the
rig-hts and duties invoh·ed rest upon principles of
18

negligence and contributory negligence. The doctrine of assumption of risk in many instances
overlaps into the field of contributory negligence;
but it must be distinguished and applied only in
a proper case, that is, when the question involves
the reasonableness of plaintiff's volunta;ry action
in the face of a known danger." (Emphasis added.)
The approach of these cases has much good sense to
recommend it. Contributory negligence serves as a somewhat questionable way of distributing losses. In cases of
strict liability, however, the problem of distributing
losses is no longer present; the law has already imposed
liability for losses upon the party who is strictly liable.
011 the other hand, strong arguments can be made that
the plaintiff's conduct should be a defense to strict liability in those cases where the plaintiff's conduct shows
that he has knoivingly assumed the risk of the danger.
See Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on
Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 267.
In the present case the record is absoluetly void of
any evidence indicating that the plaintiff, Scott Brigham,
voluntarily assumed a risk of any knoicn danger. In fact,
the eYiclence as shown by the record would strain all
reasonable credibility to show even contributory neglig-ence. At the very least, the case should be remanded,
so that the jury might be instructed to make a proper
fimliiJO"
as to whether or not the plaintiff was in fact
b
assuming the risk of danger that day on the mesa.
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POINT III. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A FINDING OF
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEG LI GEN CE.
(a) D2fendant did not sustain its burden of showing
plaintiff's contributory negligence.

The defense of contributory negligence precludes
any comparison of the negligence of defendant with that
of plaintiff. If the plaintiff is 5 percent negligent and
the def cnclant is 9G percent negligent, then, the clef ense
eliminates any recoYery. This rule often yields harsh
arn1 unreason a hle results. For this reason defendant
has the burden of showing that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. As it was put in the case of Ray v. Consolidated Freight1cays, 4 Utah 2d 137, 289 P.2d 196, 200
(1955) :
''At the out sot the mirnl nf the fact trier is presumably in ea11ipoise 011 tl!e q11estion of whether
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The
burden is upon the defendant to orercome this
balance and to impel his mind toward a conclusion." (Emphasis added.)
In the present case the defendant did little to disturb the e<Jnipoise tlrnt presumably existed in the mind of
the jnry. The 0111y significnnt eYidence presented by defendant a8 to piEintiff 's contributory negligence came in
tlw testimony of 0110 K D.1llarcl, au employee of l\10011
Lake Electric Association. Balh:rd testified as to the
substance of a c01ffersation he lrnd with young Scott the
day of the aeciclen t :
" ... Scott indicated that he saw his older brother
pick up a wire and walk under it nml he asked him
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if it was a hot wire or an electric wire and got an
answer, 'no', and apparently from the conversation the next thing he had his hand up against
the conductor and he indicated to me that he
reached up and touched the conductor ... " (Tr.
242)
Asking his brother about the wires would indicate
that Scott possessed more than normal foresight and
concern for a boy of ten. His brother, in answering, was,
as the record shows, confirming his own experience in
having brushed one of the wires without adverse consequence. Reasonable men could not assume that boys
the ages of .Michael and Scott would know that one wire
carried electricity while the other wire was harmless.
Sect! prudently reliecl on his older brother's aclvice and
had no reason to be aware of any threatening danger.
During cross examination, Scott had trouble remembering the exact occurrences of the day of the injury. Counsel for defendant then brought out a copy of
a deposition of Scott taken some seven months earlier
(Tr. 19-1). In this deposition Scott stated that "people"
had told him that he had asked .Michael whether or not
the wires were live and had been told that Michael either
dicl not know or that he said they were not. As to details,
[:lcott \ms very unclear in his own mind, as he could not
remember an of tlw e\'ents and was only repeating what
other people had told to him (Deposition of Scott
Brig-hnm R. 41). The substance of this deposition testimony was not presented to the jury. Only later during
Ballmcl 's testimony did the jury hear of this conversation, and then they were to]cl that Scott had askecl
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Michael whether the wires were li,·e and .Michael had
told him "no" (Tr. 242). This second version of the conversation was the only testimony which defendant offered to disturb the equipoise in the minds of the triers of
fact. The evidence, viewed objectively, virtually compels
the conclusion that Scott was not contributorily negligent.
Appellant submits that there was no evidence in the record upon which the jury could base its finding of contributory negligence, and thus defendant did not sustain
its lmnlu1 of showing the contributory negligence of
plaintiff.
( b) The evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding
of ccntributory negligence against the plaintiff in the instant
case.

The law is somewhat unsettled as to the application
of the doctrine of contributory negligence to children.
See 77 A.L.R. 2d 917. Some jurif'dictions apply a presumption that children between the ages of 7 and 14 are
not capable of contributory negligence (e.g., Virginia,
Louisiana, l\Iississippi and others. See 77 A.L.R. 2d 926927); however, this presumption is rebuttable by evidence brought fonvard by the defendant to show that
the child did in fact have such capacity. Most jurisdictinns, incluc1i11g Utah, see Kaicaguchi i·. Be111nett, 112
Utah 442, 180 r).:2cl 109 (1948), follow the rule that the
standard of can• to be applietl in a particular case depPnds upon the standard of care reasonably to be expedecl under the same or similar circumstances from the
ordinary child of like age, intelligence and experience.
While this standard seems vag11e and elusive, it does at
least provide a considerably lower standard of care
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for children than IS required of normal adults.
The evidence m this case does not show that
Scott had any reason to believe that the lines would cause
him harm. Even if the evidence did so show, defendant's
own evidence would counter-balance such evidence for at
the critical time as he approached the wires Scott asked
if the wires would cause him harm, and was told that
they would not. It is difficult to see, in view of the state
of the evidence, how reasonable men could conclude anything but that Scott had acted reasonably and with due
care and caution for his own safety. The evidence does
not support a verdict of contributory negligence.

CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the judgment of the lower
conrt should be reversed and the case remanded with
instructions that defendant is strictly liable if plaintiff's
injuries were in fact ca used by defects in defendant's
transmission system. Further, instructions should be
gi,·en that plaintiff's contributory negligence is no defense to the defendant. Finally, appellant suhmits that
the case should be reyersed because the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.
Respectfully submitted,

-MULLINER, PRINCE &
MANGUM
Gerald R. Miller
Denis R. Morrill
Kenneth VT. Yeates
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